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In Alex Garland’s 2015 Ex Machina, there’s this one scene where beautiful-intelligent-robot 
Ava asks coder-cum-stooge Caleb a simple question: “Do you think about me, when we 
aren’t together?” Caleb is supposed to be figuring out whether Ava is conscious or not, but 
here Ava turns the tables. She is now the one trying to figure out, and perhaps manipulate, 
Caleb. And before long all hell breaks loose. 
 
Garland’s landmark film is heavily referenced in Beth Singler’s Ghost in the Machine, made 
in association with Cambridge University’s Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence. 
This is no big-budget Hollywood production - mind you neither was Ex Machina - but its 
targets are the same. What is the relationship between intelligence and consciousness? 
Could a machine, however advanced, have feelings? These are fascinating, controversial, 
and important questions and Singler covers an awful lot of ground in just fifteen minutes. 
No less than fifteen people offer all sorts of opinions, interspersed with scenes of a 
supposedly remarkable child – a weird amalgam of Ava and Eleven from Stranger Things – 
being quizzed about ‘what it is like to be her’ in transparent homage to Ex Machina. 
 
From one perspective Singler’s strategy makes good sense. There is such a diversity of views 
on the topic of ‘machine’ or ‘artificial’ consciousness that there’s clear value in bringing this 
intellectual hodgepodge to light and letting the viewer make up their own mind. Ghost in 
the Machine does work well on this level. In the end, though, I was left without a clear sense 
of direction or purpose, perhaps an inevitable trade-off for a short film that attempts to 
cover so much. 
 
Let’s take the questions one at a time. First up is the relationship between consciousness 
and intelligence. Does consciousness require intelligence – and does intelligence, perhaps 
on exceeding some as-yet-unknown threshold, entail consciousness? It’s easy to assume 
that the two go hand-in-hand, but it’s equally easy to see that this assumption might be a 
trivial consequence of an unexamined anthropocentrism: we are intelligent (more than the 
rest) and we are conscious (and we don’t really know about the rest) so intelligence and 
consciousness must go together. 
 
Early in Singler’s film we hear from Lucy Cheke of Cambridge University’s Department of 
Psychology. Cheke has worked with Orang-utans and Eurasian Jays, and she perceives a 
flicker of human-like consciousness in both. Then Marta Halina, programme director at the 
Leverhulme Centre, cuts in to suggest that if we discovered that consciousness underpinned 
intelligence then we’d have to conclude that intelligence implied consciousness. But before 
she can explain what this might mean in practice the film swerves again, this time to an 
explanation of an EEG experiment about face recognition which, despite the claims of the 
experimenter, doesn’t really connect either with consciousness or with the ‘sense of reality’ 
that is a pervasive though often overlooked feature of everyday conscious experience. 
 
This sets the pattern for the rest of the film. Individually, the interview fragments promise 
much, but collectively they struggle. This is particularly obvious when we meet Father Ezra 
Sullivan from the Pontifical University of St Thomas Aquinas. In a fascinating snippet, Fr 
Sullivan explains that the process of human reproduction is more than “the making of a 
machine because it requires, according to our theological understanding, the intervention of 
God to create a soul for each human body … there’s always a gap there, between robot 
nature and human nature”. Instead of examining what on earth Fr Sullivan might be on 
about, Singler moves swiftly to the Chairman of the Cambridge Buddhist Centre who offers 
up a distinction between ordinary consciousness and awakened consciousness before 
hedging his bets on whether an artificial intelligence – an AI – could ever have feelings. 
 
And through these scenes we’ve segued surreptitiously from the relationship between 
intelligence and consciousness to the more sci-fi ready topic of machine consciousness. 
There are now three properties in play: consciousness, intelligence, and the property of 
being alive. Might being alive be the key requirement for consciousness, rather than being 
intelligent, or processing information in some particular way? This is where Fr Sullivan’s 
views about the soul invite further analysis. Early conceptions of soul, predating Sullivan’s 
theological understanding, were in fact closely associated with the living body. The Hindu 
concept of Ātman interpreted soul as ‘breath,’ and carried no presumption that personal 
identity would survive death of the body. In the West, the relationship between 
consciousness, soul, and life was put under the spotlight by the 18th Century polymath Julian 
Offray de La Mettrie’s controversial L’homme machine argument [1]. While Descartes had 
decided that non-human animals were merely ‘beast machines’, lacking in reason and 
consciousness (and soul), La Mettrie proposed that if animals were machines made of meat 
then so too were humans, though he left tantalizingly ambiguous whether in making this 
argument he was trying to mechanise the soul, or give reason and awareness to the 
mechanical [2]. Either way the Catholic church didn’t much like it. Perhaps not surprisingly, I 
like it very much and think that approaching the brain from the perspective of performing 
physiological regulation – as opposed to implementing some kind of substrate-independent 
intelligence – sheds considerable light on conscious perception, both of the world and of the 
self [3].  
 
The next voices bring a welcome contemporary perspective. Ron Chrisley, my colleague at 
the University of Sussex, imagines a robot describing a visual scene in the same way a 
human would. What if the robot seemed subject to the same kinds of visual illusions as we 
humans – would that be evidence of robot ‘experience’? I’m not convinced, but neither am I 
convinced that this is what Chrisley intended to convey. Then Murray Shanahan, of Imperial 
College London and latterly also DeepMind, hits the nail on the head by pointing out that 
advanced AI might not require consciousness at all, a point echoed a minute later by Anders 
Sandberg from the Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford. Shanahan also 
suggests that what we think of as normal human consciousness can be broken down into 
several potentially separable components which might manifest in different ways in other 
species or perhaps in future machines – a view I’ve also argued for [4]. 
 
Prospects of possibly conscious, potentially general, advanced AI raise a host of ethical 
concerns which speed by in the remainder of the film. As Chrisley remarks, even if true 
machine consciousness is impossible or very distant, near-future robots might be able to 
convince us that they have real feelings. Navigating such a landscape with our distinctly 
unfit-for-purpose moral compasses, tuned to seemingly self-evident distinctions between 
the living and the non-living, the aware and the unaware, might prove tricky indeed. 
Hanging over this landscape, as the philosopher Thomas Metzinger has pointed out (though 
not in this film), is the potential ethical disaster of introducing new forms of machine 
suffering into the world, a possibility that needs to be taken seriously even if it is very 
remote [5]. We hear similar sentiments in a rapid-fire parade of interview fragments, 
including one from Singler herself.  
 
Separating hype from reality in discussions of AI and consciousness is a difficult task. Within 
AI, exciting developments in what often amounts to statistical pattern recognition can be 
hard to reconcile with popular conceptions of AI as portrayed in science fiction. And 
consciousness research, while now firmly re-established at the heart of psychology and 
neuroscience [6], remains a magnet for fringe opinions and wild speculation. Kudos then to 
Singler for leading us through a thicket of diverse opinions without force-feeding us any 
particular perspective. Kudos also for giving the last word (besides Ava/Eleven and her 
mysterious interlocutor) to Murray Shanahan who reminds that technological developments 
need not always be threatening, but can also replenish the wonder we take in what we are 
and in the variety of other minds that surround us. All in all, Ghost in the Machine dishes up 
a serviceable appetizer but for the main course be sure to leave room for Ex Machina. 
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